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COVARIANT RISK AND NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING 
BRIAN SAWERS* 
Every summer, a dead zone is created in the Chesapeake Bay.  The 
dead zone is created by too much of a good thing: nutrients, especially 
nitrogen and phosphorus.  The largest source of excess nutrients in the 
Chesapeake is agriculture; manure and artificial fertilizers are washed into 
streams that eventually reach the bay.1  In the bay, nitrogen and phosphorus 
create an algae bloom, which consumes all the dissolved oxygen.  Some 
fish escape, but other creatures expire in this dead sea within the 
Chesapeake Bay.2 
To reduce the excess nutrients reaching the bay, several states are 
experimenting with nutrient credit trading.3  A large part of the appeal is 
political: Nutrient credit trading is popular in an ideological climate hostile 
to regulation.  Part of the appeal is a response to policy success.  Pollution 
trading reduced acid rain at low costs, which raised hopes that 
environmental markets can produce outsized benefits at low costs.  To date, 
nutrient credit trading has disappointed and it is likely to continue to 
disappoint.  Better market design cannot remedy the inherent defects in 
nutrient credits.  This Article identifies previously unidentified defects in 
nutrient credit markets, contributing to an already large literature on the 
shortcomings of nutrient credit trading.  This Article adds to the weight of 
mounting evidence that nutrient credit trading cannot deliver improvements 
in water quality. 
I.  WHY NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING? 
The enthusiasm for environmental markets in general, and nutrient 
credit trading in particular, does not rely solely on their merits.  The 
intellectual climate in academia and the political climate in government has 
been hostile to direct government regulation for several decades.  In a 
policy environment where government mandates are disfavored and all 
things “market” are favored, nutrient credit trading is an attractive answer to 
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 1.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD 
FOR NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS AND SEDIMENT 4–29 (2010) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE TMDL]. 
 2.  Id. at ES-3.  
 3.  In addition to Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia have nutrient credit trading schemes.  
MD. CODE REGS. 15.20.12 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:12 (West 2005). 
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poor water quality.  While all markets depend on government to some 
degree, environmental markets are entirely creatures of regulation since the 
goods traded are valuable only to the extent that the goods allow the owner 
to avoid government sanction.  The political and intellectual appeal of 
environmental markets received a significant boost by the success of the 
market for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.4  The ideological appeal of 
“market” solutions cannot entirely explain the current enthusiasm for 
nutrient credit trading.  Instead, the current fervor for nutrient credit trading 
is partly the result of the political power of farmers, coupled with a trend 
towards disguised taxation. 
There are two reasons why requiring farmers to reduce the flow of 
excess nutrients is difficult.  Most importantly, farmers have political power 
disproportionate to their numbers or wealth.  The second reason is that 
excess nutrients in the stream are invisible, at least until the inevitable algae 
bloom.  The dead zone in the Chesapeake Bay is not visible from land, let 
alone from Pennsylvania.  Furthermore, the contribution of any individual 
farm is both small and cannot be distinguished from other sources of excess 
nutrients.   
Excess nutrients are not an inevitable byproduct of agriculture. Rather, 
they are the result of specific choices made by farmers to grow certain crops 
in a particular way.  Better management practices would retain nutrients on 
the farm and thus out of the stream, but many of those practices are costly.  
Farmers will lobby against rules requiring better farming practices, 
especially if the practices are expensive, but even if the practices are merely 
novel.  Thus, government believes it cannot require farmers to protect water 
quality.  Instead, nutrient credit trading enables government to bribe farmers 
to adopt better management practices. 
Maryland raises the revenue to fund bribes to farmers (and others) 
transparently. Maryland imposes a “flush tax” of sixty dollars on each 
sewer bill with the revenue dedicated to water quality projects.  
Municipalities receive money to upgrade waste water treatment plants.  
Homeowners receive money for septic tanks that retain nutrients.  Farmers 
are paid to plant cover crops, a better management practice that retains 
sediment and nutrients in the field.5 
In contrast, Pennsylvania has chosen to disguise the taxes necessary to 
fund the bribes paid to its farmers.  Nutrient credit trading does not impose 
                                                          
 4.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency established a market in pollution credits in 
the Acid Rain Program under the authority of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7651 (2012); see e.g., The Invisible Green Hand, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1200205 (calling the Acid Rain Program the “greatest green 
success story of the past decade”). 
 5.  2012 Md. Laws 927, 933–38. 
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a direct charge on either taxpayers or water ratepayers.  Instead, the costs 
imposed are distributed by the sale of nutrient credits, which disguises both 
the amount and the ultimate recipients.  In a nutrient trading scheme like 
Pennsylvania’s, the buyers of nutrient credits are developers and waste 
water treatment plants.  Both developers and waste water treatment plants 
will shift the costs onward. Developers are not charities; whatever costs are 
imposed on the construction of new homes are ultimately borne by the 
buyers of new homes.  Waste water treatment plants run by private entities 
will similarly shift the cost to ratepayers.  Even public waste water 
treatment plants must cover their costs, so the cost of buying nutrient credits 
will be shifted to ratepayers.  Instead of a transparent tax on each user, new 
homes will be more expensive and water bills will be higher, concealing the 
true burden of the scheme.  Farmers are expected to be the largest source of 
nutrient credits and thus the ultimate recipients of much of this 
redistribution through disguised taxation. 
Although several other states in the Chesapeake watershed do operate 
nutrient credit markets, Pennsylvania is particularly worthy of attention.  
Even though Pennsylvania does not border the Chesapeake Bay, its impact 
is outsized because of its share of the land area of the drainage and its large 
number of farms, especially dairy farms.  Each year, the manure from a 
single dairy cow includes more than 360 pounds of nitrogen and 60 pounds 
of phosphorus.6  Roughly half the farms in the Chesapeake watershed are in 
Pennsylvania.  The nutrient pollution in the Susquehanna has a greater 
effect than pollution elsewhere in the Chesapeake watershed.7  
Pennsylvania contributes forty-four percent of the nitrogen and twenty-four 
percent of phosphorus flowing into the Bay.8  The next largest contributor 
of nitrogen to the Bay is Virginia, which is responsible for twenty-seven 
percent of the total.9  Of the excess nutrients contributed by agriculture, 
Pennsylvania contributes more than half the nitrogen and a quarter of the 
phosphorus.10  Thus, Pennsylvania’s nutrient credit trading program 
deserves special scrutiny, given its importance to the Chesapeake. 
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) 
oversees nutrient credit trading, including certifying credits.11  Most buyers 
of nutrient credits hold National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
                                                          
 6.  UNIV. OF CAL. COOP. EXTENSION, MANURE TECHNICAL GUIDE SERIES: DAIRY MANURE 
NUTRIENT CONTENT AND FORMS (2009). 
 7.  CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at ES-7 tbl. ES-1; ES-6 fig. ES-2.  For contribution 
by watershed, see id. at 4-3 to 4-4 figs. 4-4, 4-5 & 4-6. 
 8.  Id. at 4-1 to 4-2 figs. 4-1, 4-2 & 4-3. 
 9.  Id.  Virginia, however, does contribute more phosphorus than Pennsylvania.  Id. at 4-2 
fig. 4-3. 
 10.  Id. at 4-5 fig. 4-1 & 4-2. 
 11.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (2010). 
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(“NPDES”) permits.12  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) has delegated the authority to issue NPDES permits to DEP, but 
retains authority to police the permits.  Nutrient credit trading in 
Pennsylvania began in 2004, predating the EPA’s determination of 
Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load for Nitrogen, Phosphorus and 
Sediment (“TMDL”).13  As of 2017, Pennsylvania is likely to miss its 
pollutant reduction targets under the Chesapeake TMDL.  Waste water 
treatment plants are on-track to meet their targets, whereas agriculture is 
not.14 
II. RECOGNIZED CHALLENGES 
The literature on nutrient credit trading has identified several 
shortcomings.  The first problem is verification, since the returns to fraud 
are significant.  Secondly, trading between point sources and nonpoint 
sources presents the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and reduced 
compliance.  Thirdly, establishing a market in nutrient credit requires 
establishing a baseline that determines which activities generate credits.  
Setting the wrong baseline can impede the development of a market in 
nutrient credits or produce smaller than anticipated environmental benefits.  
Lastly, many environmental markets establish trading ratios between 
different nutrient credits, which can similarly hobble market development. 
Ensuring the validity of nutrient credits is a significant and persistent 
problem.  Nutrient credits are valuable and thus there is money to be made 
in faking them.  Ordinarily, buyers police the quality of the goods 
themselves.  Thus, supermarkets do not sell counterfeit avocados because 
customers can tell the difference and prefer an actual avocado to papier-
mâché or plastic replica avocados.  But, no one buys a nutrient credit for 
themselves since the nutrient credits have no value to the buyer except to 
satisfy a government mandate.  If there is no or low risk of detection, 
buyers will prefer cheaper counterfeit credits to more expensive real credits.  
In this way, nutrient credits are analogous to engagement rings.  Generally, 
the fiancé buys the ring for his fiancée.  If an unscrupulous jeweler offered 
him a counterfeit diamond for less, he would prefer that,15 assuming his 
deception would not be discovered.  The ring has no value to him; its only 
value is to the third party. 
                                                          
 12.  33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (establishing a national permit program for the “discharge of 
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants”). 
 13.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PENNSYLVANIA’S TRADING AND OFFSET 
PROGRAMS REVIEW OBSERVATIONS 9 (2012). 
 14.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S 2016–
2017 MILESTONES PROGRESS 1 (2012). 
 15.  To readers who are the author’s wife: he did not do that. 
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Even if government can prevent the trading of counterfeit nutrient 
credits, low-quality credits will come to dominate, reducing the overall 
environmental benefit.  Nutrient credits are akin to money, since these 
credits are both a medium of exchange and a measure of value.16  Like 
money, nutrient credits are subject to Gresham’s Law.  Gresham’s Law is a 
principle of monetary economics that “bad money drives out good.”17  But 
here, the mechanism is somewhat different.  When money was coin, people 
would hoard coins with more gold or silver and spend coins with less 
valuable alloys.  In the market, bad money (with little gold or silver) would 
drive out good money.  The mechanics of Gresham’s Law in nutrient 
credits are different, since credits expire at the end of the water year, which 
limits hoarding.  Yet, a similar dynamic operates since all nutrients are not 
the same quality, just like coins.  Here, lower quality means the credit 
represents a smaller or less certain environmental benefit.  Lower-quality 
credits will often be cheaper to generate and thus undercut high-quality 
credits on price.  So long as buyers do not distinguish between the quality 
of credits, the cheapest credits will dominate the market.  If the cheapest 
credits are also low quality, the worst credits will outcompete nutrient credit 
of higher quality. 
All environmental markets suffer from verification problems, but 
nutrient credits are more susceptible for two reasons.  First, the number of 
sellers is greater than in other pollution credit markets.18  There are 84,000 
farms in the Chesapeake watershed.19  Even if a small share of farms 
generates credits, the number of credit generators would be large and thus 
the cost of verification would be colossal.  Second, many of the agricultural 
practices that generate credits are difficult to monitor.  Some agricultural 
practices, like riparian buffers, can be monitored somewhat cheaply.  A 
single site visit can confirm the existence of a riparian buffer; infrequent 
trips back to the farm can confirm whether the buffer has been damaged by 
heavy rain or grazing.  In contrast, some agricultural practices require 
essentially continuous monitoring to confirm whether nutrients are being 
                                                          
 16.  Nutrient credits do not satisfy the third characteristic of money since these credits are not 
a good store of value.  Credits expire at the end of the water year and so do not hold their value. 
 17.  Although named after Sir Thomas Gresham, the process has been observed many times 
since the advent of money.  See, e.g., The Frogs by Aristophanes, in THREE GREEK PLAYS FOR 
THE THEATRE 173 (Peter D. Arnott ed., trans., 1961). 
 18.  The Acid Rain Program applies to 1226 facilities for SO2 and 336 facilities for NOx, but 
the number of entities trading is much smaller since most firms own many facilities.  Less than a 
fifth of trades of SO2 are between separate entities; the rest are related-party transactions.  U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 2015 Program Progress—Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and Acid 
Rain Program 14, 52 (2015). 
 19.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, CHESAPEAKE BAY 2011 ACTIVITIES REPORT 1 (2011). 
EPA estimates a slightly higher figure of 87,000 farms.  CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at 4-
29. 
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kept out of the stream.  For example, manure spreading or tillage practices 
would need to be monitored throughout the year.  Farmers generate credits 
when manure or fertilizer is applied at rates below agronomic rates in the 
current Penn State University Agronomy Guide.20  Thus, verifying the 
nutrient credit means monitoring the amount and the timing of manure 
application, not just whether manure was applied or not. 
Verification problems are largely a problem of nonpoint sources.  
Point sources are much better positioned to generate credits of high quality 
because these sources maintain ongoing monitoring of their discharge.  
Waste water treatment plants can generate nutrient credits when those 
plants remove more nutrients than required by law.  Plants can generate 
cleaner water than required by investing in better equipment or running the 
plant differently, which is costly.  If a waste water plant exceeds the 
regulatory baseline, that excess represents a reduction in nutrients being 
returned to the stream and thus is a credit.  Absent outright fraud and record 
falsification, waste water treatment plants generate nutrient credits of high 
quality because nutrients in the water discharged are already monitored 
continuously. 
Among nutrient credits generated by nonpoint sources, hauling poultry 
manure outside of the Chesapeake watershed presents the smallest 
verification problems.  Unlike swine and cattle manure, poultry manure is 
dry, which makes hauling economical since the amount of nitrogen and 
phosphorus is high relative to the water content and thus the weight of the 
load.  The trucks can be weighed leaving the farm and arriving at the 
destination, where the poultry manure is applied according to a nutrient 
management plan.21  Generally, the main destination for poultry manure are 
reclaimed mining sites where fertilizer would be applied anyway to 
encourage re-growth, which also controls erosion. 
Trading between point and nonpoint sources is generally expected to 
constitute most of the activity in nutrient credit markets.  In fact, it is often 
the rationale.  Many point sources have already taken all the cheaper steps 
to reduce their discharges.  Any further improvements in water quality are 
more expensive.  In contrast, nonpoint sources have taken fewer steps, 
leaving more of the cheaper steps still to be done.  Thus, the cost of 
reducing nutrients in the stream from the typical nonpoint source is cheaper 
than from the typical point source.  For a point source, it is generally 
cheaper to pay a nonpoint source to reduce its nutrient contribution to the 
stream than it is for the point source to make further nutrient reductions in 
its discharge. 
                                                          
 20.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(3) (2010). 
 21.  PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 8 (2016). 
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Trading between point and non-point sources presents the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage.  As the locus of nutrient reduction shifts from 
regulated point sources to unregulated nonpoint sources, the ability of non-
government actors to monitor and help enforce environmental law is 
weakened.  The Clean Water Act permits citizen suits against point sources 
that do not comply with a standard, limit, or order.22  Trading, however, 
undermines this remedy by shifting compliance from point to nonpoint 
sources.  If a waste water treatment plant failed to comply with a standard, 
limit, or order, an affected citizen could sue the plant.  Instead, if the waste 
water treatment plant buys nutrient credits that do not represent real 
environmental benefits, there is no potential for a citizen suit.  A citizen suit 
is not permitted against the nonpoint source, even if that source produces a 
defective credit, which means that the point source credit buyer is 
noncompliant.  Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether trading 
has produced regulatory arbitrage without knowing how many credits are 
defective, which is difficult because of verification problems already 
discussed. 
A third problem that nutrient credit trading faces is the challenge of 
setting the baseline.  Since nutrient credits represent reductions in nutrients 
beyond the baseline, the regulator must determine a baseline before any 
credits can be generated.23  The baseline identifies a number, or set of 
numbers, from which all credits are calculated.  All nutrient credits are 
measured from this baseline; the baseline is the zero in the number system. 
If the baseline is set too low, a nutrient credit is cheap to generate. 
Farmers, like other producers, generally know their own costs and thus 
prioritize, taking the easiest and cheapest steps first and leaving the more 
difficult and expensive steps until later. But, each credit generated from a 
low baseline represents a small environmental benefit.  Sellers generate 
many credits and credits are cheap, but the environmental benefit is smaller 
since the starting point was set low.  Thus, a low baseline is good for 
nutrient credit trading since credits are cheap and plentiful, but bad for the 
environment.  Since improvement in water quality is the goal and nutrient 
credit trading is only the means, a low baseline elevates the process at the 
expense of the goal. 
Conversely, a high baseline means that sellers cannot generate credits 
by taking cheaper and easiest steps.  Instead, sellers can only generate 
credits by taking more difficult and expensive steps to reduce their pollution 
even more.  Under a high baseline, sellers will find credits expensive to 
                                                          
 22.  33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 135.1–135.2 (2016) (providing notice 
and standing requirements for citizen suits). 
 23.  Pollution credits do not depend on a baseline.  Instead, the regulator decides how much 
pollution to permit and then distributes or auctions shares of the total permitted pollution. 
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generate.  Each nutrient credit will represent a larger environmental benefit.  
Yet, the high baseline will deter many sellers from participating because 
each credit is too expensive to generate.24  If sellers do not participate, the 
anticipated environmental benefits may not materialize. 
Pennsylvania has set a high baseline, at least relative to actually 
existing farm practices.  A high baseline discourages farmer involvement 
and means that nutrient credits are expensive.  In Pennsylvania, the baseline 
is set at the management practices required by state law.  Farmers must 
comply with management practices set by four different statutory 
requirements: erosion and sediment control, pollution control, nutrient 
management, and concentrated animal feeding operations, if applicable.25  
In addition, there are specific requirements for riparian buffers and fertilizer 
application.26 
Sellers must show that their farm exceeds the legal standard to 
generate a credit.  At first blush, asking farmers to follow the law before 
being rewarded does not seem like a high baseline.  Yet, the lack of 
enforcement by the state and the lack of compliance by farmers means that 
minimum standards set by state law are actually a high baseline to set.  
State management practices are observed in the breach, meaning that most 
farmers cannot generate credits without first spending significant resources 
to meet the state standard.  Only the portion of the improvement that 
exceeds the state standard generates a marketable credit.  Before generating 
a single nutrient credit, a farmer would have to take expensive steps to 
bring their agricultural practices into compliance with state law, but these 
laws are not enforced.  All the expense of meeting the state agricultural 
standards falls on the farmer since no credits are generated.  Thus, the cost 
of generating nutrient credits is high for many farmers.27 
Some environmental markets set a trading ratio between different 
credits.  Trading ratios are supposed to compensate for the uncertainty 
associated with nonpoint nutrient control or allow for trading one pollutant 
for another.  Additionally, trading ratios can be used to adjust for 
differences where the pollution is introduced or between different 
pollutants.  For example, upstream pollution could be treated more leniently 
than downstream pollution because less of the upstream pollution will reach 
                                                          
 24.  Gaurav Ghosh et al., Baseline Requirements Can Hinder Trades in Water Quality 
Trading Programs: Evidence from the Conestoga Watershed, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 2076, 2083 
(2011).  
 25.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(2) (2010). 
 26.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(3) (2010). 
 27.  If Pennsylvania enforced its state agricultural standards, then farmers would already meet 
the standard and any improvements beyond that would generate nutrient credits.  Of course, if 
Pennsylvania enforced its agricultural standards, there might be less need for nutrient credit 
trading. 
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the bay.  While traveling to the bay, some nutrients are used up or trapped 
in sediment, so excess nutrients far upstream have a smaller impact.  
Alternately, credits for nitrogen could be exchanged for phosphorus credits. 
A trading ratio is effectively a discount or exchange rate applied to a 
credit, making it less valuable.  In comparison to nonpoint sources, the 
discharge from point sources is less variable while being better monitored.  
The EPA notes that nonpoint sources generate credits that are less certain in 
measurement, implementation, and performance.28  Thus, regulators may 
treat a credit from a nonpoint source as less valuable.29  The uncertainty that 
nonpoint source nutrient credits suffer from makes determining the 
appropriate discount or exchange rate difficult.  Are nonpoint source 
nutrient credits worth half of point source nutrient credits?  If the regulator 
knew how little the nonpoint source nutrient credit was worth, then it would 
not be uncertain, and no discount would be necessary.  In addition, any 
fixed trading ratio will allow arbitrage between the relatively cheaper credit 
and the more expensive credit.  Even if the ratio was initially set at the 
correct level, time may shift the costs of nutrient removal to make the ratio 
no longer true. 
Pennsylvania does not permit trading nutrients; therefore, nitrogen 
cannot be traded for phosphorus.  Reductions in excess nutrients are 
adjusted for where the pollutants enter the stream since excess nutrients 
introduced downstream have a greater impact on the Chesapeake.  The DEP 
has calculated delivery ratios for all significant point sources30 and for 
stream segments.31  The delivery ratio allows trading between downstream 
and upstream sources.  Without a delivery ratio to adjust for the differential 
rates of nutrients reaching the bay, the environmental benefits would be 
unpredictable.  All nutrient credits in Pennsylvania are subject to a ten 
percent reserve, regardless of source.32  When Pennsylvania began nutrient 
credit trading, the scheme imposed a twenty percent adjustment on credits 
generated by nonpoint sources.33  In 2014, EPA objected to NPDES permits 
issued by Pennsylvania’s DEP that permitted nutrient credit trading, since 
reductions from farms cannot be measured accurately.34  To preserve 
                                                          
 28.  U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT 
WRITERS: WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: POINT SOURCE–NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING 4 
(2009). 
 29.  James S. Shortle & Richard D. Horan, Water Quality Trading, 14 PA. ST. ENVT’L L. 
REV. 231, 243 (2006). 
 30.  PA. DEPT. ENVT’L PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
WASTEWATER SUPPLEMENT 5 (2017). 
 31.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (c) (2010). 
 32.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (a) (2010). 
 33.  25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d) (2010). 
 34.  PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 1 (2016). The EPA was not convinced that nutrient credits 
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Pennsylvania’s ability to issue NPDES permits and the nascent nutrient 
credit trading, DEP adopted a variety of interim measures including a 3:1 
trading ratio starting in 2015.  Also, DEP has suspended the certification of 
new nutrient credits, so no new generators can enter the market.35 
In addition to the problems that affect all nutrient credit schemes, 
Pennsylvania’s system suffers from two self-imposed difficulties.  The most 
significant problem is the timing of the water year.  Nutrient credits are 
good for one water year, which begins on October 1 and ends the following 
September 30.36  Pennsylvania set that as the compliance year since most 
buyers hold NPDES permits and those permits follow the U.S. Geologic 
Service water year, which coincides with the federal fiscal year.  
Administrative convenience, however, conflicts with the weather.  
Although the Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30, 
there is a sharp peak in late August and early September.37  Thus, it is 
possible that the state will see most of its heavy rain at the end of the water 
year, when it is too late to generate credits or adjust plant operation to 
reduce the need for credits.  On the farm, heavy rain can damage riparian 
buffers and wash manure into streams.  Also, waste water treatment plants 
are often overwhelmed by heavy rain, especially if the city uses a combined 
sanitary and storm drain system.  Thus, managers release untreated or 
undertreated water rather than see the waste water treatment plant destroyed 
by flooding.  Of the sixty-four combined systems in the Chesapeake 
watershed, forty are in Pennsylvania.38   
There is a second problem with Pennsylvania’s approach to nutrient 
credit trading.  Pennsylvania has encouraged the development of credit 
auctions.  The Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority 
(“PENNVEST”) provides funding to local government, including for waste 
water treatment.  In addition, PENNVEST created a nutrient credit auction, 
which it calls a clearinghouse.  The auctions determine a single price, which 
applies to all completed trades.39  Participants in the auction do not deal 
directly; instead PENNVEST is the counterparty to all buyers and sellers.  
The auction is structured so that buyers cannot bid on specific credits 
                                                          
could be calculated from the better management practices without measurement.  U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, PENNSYLVANIA’S TRADING AND OFFSET PROGRAMS REVIEW 
OBSERVATIONS 9 (2012). 
 35.  PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 1, 7–8 (2016). 
 36.  PA. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 2 (2016). 
 37.  NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE PEAK OF THE HURRICANE SEASON–
WHY NOW? (2016), http://www.noaa.gov/stories/peak-of-hurricane-season-why-now. 
 38.  CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at 4-18, Tbl 4-13. 
 39.  PENNVEST NUTRIENT CREDIT CLEARINGHOU SE RULEBOOK: VERSION 8, at 2 (2017). 
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generated by specific sellers.  Instead, every seller receives the same price, 
regardless of the seller’s reliability or method for generating credits. 
While single-price auctions are good at determining prices for 
homogenous goods, nutrient credits are not homogenous.  Each credit 
represents an identical reduction in nutrients, but quality of the credit is 
highly variable.  Some credits are generated in a way that is robust and 
verifiable.  As noted before, waste water treatment plants generate credits of 
very certain value.  Other credits may depend on management practices that 
are unmonitored, for example manure application.  Also, the identity of the 
seller matters.  The buyer wants a solvent seller, especially in the event the 
seller cannot deliver the credits.  A solvent seller can buy replacement 
credits to deliver to the buyer if she is unable to generate the credits herself. 
Municipal water authorities have resources beyond most farmers and 
other credit generators.  Water authorities receive a steady stream of 
revenue from ratepayers and often borrow money.  In contrast, farmers have 
uncertain revenues and very limited access to credit.  Many small farms are 
already highly leveraged, meaning there is no capacity to absorb a shock 
like unexpectedly unavailable credits.  But, nutrient credit buyers want a 
solvent seller, so that in the event of breach, the buyer can be made whole, 
either by buying replacement credits or paying whatever fine is levied for 
noncompliance. 
Single-price auctions prevent buyers from verifying credits and 
supercharge Gresham’s Law.  Even if they wanted, buyers cannot select 
their sellers.  Price is the only thing that matters because the auction has 
been designed to find a single market price and ignore every other aspect of 
the transaction.  Instead of an auction, Pennsylvania should encourage 
either direct sales or the emergence of brokers.  As larger, repeat players, 
brokers will have more resources and thus be able to substitute for the 
insolvent farmers.  Since brokers do not want to substitute for their 
defaulting credit generators, brokers will police the reliability of sellers.  
Also, brokers will have reputations to preserve, so there should be pressure 
to verify nutrient credits. 
III.  COVARIANT RISK 
The existing literature on nutrient credit trading has not identified 
covariant risk as a stumbling block.  Covariance is a measure of the degree 
to which two variables move in tandem.  Thus, covariant risk is the risk that 
two events will occur at the same time.  Identifying covariant risk is 
particularly important because covariant risk may be the most significant 
challenge for nutrient trading and one that better market design cannot 
overcome.  In contrast, other shortcomings in existing nutrient trading 
schemes can be overcome by improved verification and enforcement, 
 12 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 77:1 
 
setting appropriate baselines, and shifting the timing of the water year.  
Conversely, covariant risk is inescapable and probably dooms nutrient 
credit trading. 
Nutrient credit trading cannot eliminate the risk that all participants 
suffer from the same event.  Rain affects water quality on both sides of the 
nutrient credit trading.  In the Chesapeake watershed, hurricanes (and 
related tropical storms) bring heavy rain, even very far inland.  When 
rainfall is high, many sellers cannot generate the credits promised.  Heavy 
rainfall increases run-off from farms.  More importantly, stream buffers and 
other management practices are degraded by erosion during heavy rain.  
Heavy rain will affect all farm sellers similarly, shrinking the number of 
credits available.  Some waste water treatment plants generate credits by 
removing nutrients in excess of their legal obligation.  But in many cities, 
storm drains combine with sanitary drains, overwhelming the treatment 
infrastructure.40  When storm water overwhelms the plant, untreated (or 
undertreated) water is released and fewer credits are generated.  Even 
though farmers and waste water treatment plants generate nutrient credits in 
very different ways, both are affected by the same heavy rain.  The only 
nutrient credit generators largely immune to the weather are those who 
truck poultry manure outside of the watershed.41 
For essentially the same reasons, nutrient credit buyers need more 
credits when there is heavy rain.  Heavy rain overwhelms all waste water 
treatment plants, not just those operating beyond the regulatory standard.  
Thus, a waste water treatment plant that expected to release a certain 
nutrient concentration would release more nutrients than anticipated.  Those 
excess nutrients must be offset by credits purchased.  If the heavy rain came 
earlier in the water year, it might be possible to meet the regulatory 
requirement by treating water for the rest of the year to a higher standard.  
Near the end of the water year, there is no alternative except purchasing 
nutrient credits. 
Heavy rain increases demand while shrinking supply.  Thus, the price 
will increase sharply as buyers compete for the few credits available.  
Heavy rain will produce price spikes and shortages, making nutrient credit 
trading less attractive because buyers will not be able to find enough credits 
and those credits will be extremely expensive.  Buying nutrient credits will 
not be a cost-effective way to meet the requirement, instead it will be an 
unpredictable and heavy expense.  Although municipal water authorities 
can pass costs onto ratepayers or borrow, neither is attractive since 
                                                          
 40.  See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPACTS AND CONTROL OF CSOS AND 
SSOS (2004). 
 41.  PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 7–8 (2016). 
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ratepayers are sensitive to price increases and authorities, as public 
institutions, are politically constrained.  Even entirely private water 
companies operate in a somewhat political environment because the social 
expectation is that water will be both plentiful and cheap, unlike other 
markets. 
But, the effect on price and quantity is probably less important than the 
effect on trades already done.  Many of the sellers will be unable to deliver 
the promised credits.  Farmers will not be able to generate credits from now 
destroyed stream buffers.  Waste water treatments plants that operated 
above the standard earlier in the year to generate nutrient credits will see the 
expected credits disappear as the plant releases nutrient-heavy water during 
heavy rain.  For the same reason that replacement credits are needed, 
replacement credits may be unavailable.  Sellers will find their investment 
in credit generation devalued or even made worthless, discouraging them 
from generating credits in the future.  Buyers will find that relying on 
nutrient credit trading was false comfort.  Buyers with NPDES permits are 
not exempt from the permit requirements because the buyer contracted to 
buy credits that were never delivered.42  Instead, buyers will find that 
nutrient credit trading does not help them meet regulatory requirements, at 
least in years with heavy rain late in the water year. 
There are steps that buyers can take to protect themselves from heavy 
rain and the consequent price spikes and defaults.  Buyers could (better) 
ensure sufficient credits by purchasing more credits than necessary in a 
typical year.  A buyer would have to acquire credits sufficient to satisfy 
both its greater need for credits and the expected default rate.  In a year 
without heavy rain, many of the credits would expire unused.  In dry years, 
the typical buyer would need fewer credits because its effluent had fewer 
nutrients.  Also, its counterparties would not default.  In years with heavy 
rain, however, the buyer would use every credit, both because its effluent 
was nutrient-rich and therefore, the buyer needed more credits, but also 
because many of the sellers it bought credits from would default.  If the 
buyer can recover the sales price from defaulting sellers, the cost of this 
extra assurance in wet years might not be so great.  But, many sellers will 
be insolvent in wet years.  In dry years, however, unused credits would 
appear to be a very expensive form of assuring that sufficient credits were 
available. 
But, it is unclear whether allowing many credits to expire unused each 
year is politically feasible.  In every dry year, many more credits would be 
bought than used, which looks like waste.  To pay for credits that might 
                                                          
 42.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT 
WRITERS: WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: POINT SOURCE–NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING 
29 (2009). 
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expire unused in most years, the municipal water authority would have to 
impose higher water rates than if it never bought credits that expired 
unused.  Even if the cost of letting nutrient credits expire in dry years is less 
than the cost of meeting the regulatory standard through plant 
improvements (or higher ongoing treatment costs), the apparent waste 
presents a communication problem.  That problem is two-fold because the 
plant managers must convince both the authority’s board and the public that 
the plant will buy nutrient credits, some of which will expire unused in 
most years.  In a climate hostile to government spending, the cost of letting 
credits expire unused may be insurmountable.  Even if cheaper, unused 
credits look like waste and oftentimes the perception dominates the reality. 
Covariant risk may doom nutrient credit trading.  This author is 
pessimistic, but the architects of nutrient credit schemes can attempt to 
minimize the effect of covariant risk by doing three things: 
First, the end of the water year should not fall during the hurricane 
season.  Instead, the water year should end just before, perhaps in mid-
summer.  If the water year begins with the hurricane season, both buyers 
and sellers have the remainder of the year to plan accordingly.  While 
farmers may struggle to generate large numbers of credits between 
November and the following June, other sellers can generate credits 
quickly.  For example, waste water treatment plants can treat water beyond 
the permit requirement. 
Second, regulating one year at a time may be suboptimal.  Since 
rainfall varies from year to year, a longer regulatory period should reduce 
the risk of heavy rain and therefore market failure.  In a sense, each year’s 
rainfall is a sample from the population which is the climate.  Larger 
samples should be more regular than smaller samples.  A longer period than 
one year, however, does not protect against the risk that the heavy rain will 
come at the end of the period.  Heavy rain at the end of a water decade 
presents the same problems as heavy rain at the end of the water year.  
Additionally, a longer period would allow water quality to suffer in any 
given year, so long as water quality over the period met the standard.  Many 
biological processes depend on water quality at every moment, not just on 
average.  Fish need water with dissolved oxygen continuously, not just on 
average.  Since the climate is not stable, a long-term trend of increasing 
rain, and heavy rain, in particular, could present recurrent end of period 
problems.  On average, the end of every period will appear wetter than 
expected because the long-term trend is towards heavy rain.43  Therefore, a 
longer regulatory period may not cure the problem. 
                                                          
 43.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 44 (2014). 
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Lastly, letting credits expire unused presents a communication 
problem, which becomes a political problem.  To solve the problem of 
perception, the architects of nutrient trading schemes may want to add 
another layer of deception.  The unused credits are insurance, but it might 
be more palatable if a market intermediary held the credits that expire 
unused.  Insurance is prudent and thus an insurance policy is not waste.  
While paying an insurance premium is equivalent to buying credits that will 
expire unused, buyers may find it more palatable.  Of course, the market 
regulator will need to oversee the insurer for the same reasons that 
government regulates more traditional types of insurance.  Setting aside 
insufficient assets (buying too few credits) would provide a competitive 
advantage and thus reckless insurers would come to dominate the market, at 
least until the wet year when the insurance would fail.  There are costs 
associated with market intermediaries, which will ultimately be borne by 
buyers, but the increased costs may be less than the alternative, which is 
avoiding nutrient credit trading because of the communication problem. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Nutrient credit trading suffers from several shortcomings already 
identified in the literature, including the difficulty of verification, regulatory 
arbitrage, and the inherent difficulties in setting baselines and trading ratios.  
In Pennsylvania, nutrient credit trading suffers from several specific 
difficulties, including the mistiming of the regulatory year and an emphasis 
on auctions.  None of the existing literature, however, identifies covariant 
risk, which this Article argues may present an insurmountable obstacle to 
nutrient credit trading. 
In the eastern United States, our weather “sendeth rain on the just and 
on the unjust.”44  Heavy rain prevents sellers from generating credits.  The 
same rain means that buyers need more credits.  The market for nutrient 
credits will see unstable prices, with predictable peaks in price (with 
potential shortages) at unpredictable times.  The result is that nutrient credit 
trading may be impossible because unstable prices will make planning by 
both buyers and sellers impossible.  Covariant risk may present 
insurmountable problems for nutrient credit trading, suggesting that direct 
regulation of agriculture may be necessary. 
                                                          
 44.  Matthew 5:45 (King James). 
